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I. THE CASELOAD PROBLEM
A. Rising Caseload And Delay
T HE increasingly serious and all-embracing problem faced by the
National Labor Relations Board arises from an unexpected and
almost unexplainable upsurge in the number of cases. For the first ten
years of the Taft-Hartley Act, this number remained fairly constant
with the Board receiving in the neighborhood of 13,000 unfair labor
practice charges and representation petitions in each of these years.
Then something happened. In 1958, the number of cases jumped to
16,000; in 1959 and 1960, to 21,000, and in 1961, to over 22,000.
They are running now at the rate of over 23,000, an increase of
10,000 cases a year in five years.
An unfortunate but unavoidable consequence was delay; the five
members of the Labor Board were simply unable to handle the in-
creased number of disputes. The answer to this "delay" problem
given by every independent group which has studied the problem
is the delegation of Board authority, subject to a discretionary type
of review. This solution has been endorsed by every present member,
and every recent past Chairman, of the National Labor Relations
Board.
B. R-Case Delay Reduced By Delegation
The Landrum-Griflin amendments permit the board to delegate
greater authority in representation cases to the Regional Directors.
This delegation was made effective on May 15, 1961. As of the
middle of October 1961, the Board had processed 550 election cases,
received 101 requests for Board review, and granted thirteen such
requests. The consequences of the delegation were as expected. The
average number of days from date of petition to direction of election
dropped from ninety to fourty-four days, more than a fifty per cent
time saving.
*A.B., Williams College; LL.B., Harvard University; LL.D., Olivet College; formerly
Director, Labor Education Division, Roosevelt University; Chairman, National Labor
Relations Board. This Article was adapted from a speech delivered to the Eighth Annual
Institute on Labor Law, Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas, November 3, 1961.
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Thus other touchy problems of unit determinations (what to do
about technicals, driver-salesmen, seasonal supervisors, craft sever-
ance, employer administrative arrangements, etc.), jurisdiction (e.g.,
foreign flag ships), contract bar, permissible limits of representation
election campaign propaganda, eligibility, schism and the like, still
abound. However, the delay factor in our representation casework
has been greatly reduced by delegation.
The President's Reorganization Plan Number 5 would have per-
mitted the delegation of similar authority in unfair labor practice
cases to our Trial Examiners, but Congress rejected this plan. As
of the last count, it took approximately 400 days to process an
unfair labor practice case. The majority of these cases charge em-
ployer discrimination against employees for their union activities.
In fiscal 1961, for example, seventy-eight per cent of the charges
against employers involved allegations of illegal discharge. No matter
how just the grievance may be, it still takes approximately 400 days
to process the case. The panel of labor experts appointed by the then
Senator Kennedy and headed by the present Solicitor General Archi-
bald Cox commented that "these shocking delays seriously affect the
usefulness of the National Labor Relations Act."
C. Board Procedures Being Reviewed
The Board is well aware of this delay problem, and a task force
headed by Board Member Gerald Brown is now exploring the pos-
sibility of revising our Rules of Procedure throughout the pleading,
the hearing, the appeal, and the post-decisional stages, with the
emphasis upon sharpening the issues and shortening the records
and stages of delay. This task force has already made some valuable
suggestions concerning internal management problems, which should
be beneficial.
Insofar as delay is caused by an increasingly large caseload, there
are several tools known to Congress by which this "input" of cases
may be discouraged. For example, in the related field governed by
the Railway Labor Act, Congress made it a crime punishable by
fine and imprisonment for an employer in the industries covered by
this Act to interfere in the employees' right of self-organization. To
cite a second device designated to prevent violations of the law in
allied areas of conduct, the Walsh-Healey Act permits (but does
not require) the "blacklisting" of government contractors who
violate the minimum wage, maximum hour, and bookkeeping pro-
visions of that Act.
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II. THE INJUNCTION PROBLEM
A. Greater Use Of Taft-Hartley Injunctions
Congress has given the Board neither of the tools provided in the
Railway Labor Act or the Walsh-Healey Act to discourage repeated
violations of the Labor-Management Relations Act, and hence a
large caseload exists; but Congress has not left the Board impotent
to prevent irreparable injury during the long period it takes during
the administrative process. Congress has provided in sub-sections
10(e), (f), (j), and (1) of the Act that the Board either may or
shall seek temporary injunctive relief in the courts.
The use of the labor injunction is thus a "new" problem for the
Board-new because our delay problem makes us re-examine its
potential; new also because of an increased public awareness and
interest in its proper utilization.
The Cox Panel, mentioned above, spent considerable time on the
problems of the Taft-Hartley injunctions. Late in the spring of
1961 a Congressional Subcommittee under the chairmanship of
Congressman Roman Pucinski conducted an extended series of hear-
ings on the NLRB Administration of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act. Witness after witness singled out the use of the injunction
as a key topic for his testimony.
This public concern necessitates a re-examination of the problems
involved; but before turning to the problems of the Taft-Hartley
injunctions, I would like to sketch the problems of the labor in-
junction in general terms. A return to first principles is sometimes
helpful when re-examining an old problem in new guise.
As noted by Frankfurter and Greene on the opening page of their
classic treatise, The Labor Injunction, "How labor injunctions came
to be and how they operate in practice, the uses which they serve
and the abuses to which they have given rise, must be known if we
are to determine whether the labor injunction in action represents a
desirable social policy."'
B. Early History Of Labor Injunctions
The history of the judicial efforts to crush labor unions is quite
lengthy. Initially, as illustrated by the 1806 Philadelphia Cordwain-
ers Case,' any combination of workmen to raise their wages was held
to be criminal in and of itself.
The War between the States witnessed the amassing of large
'Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction 1 (1930).
'Commonwealth v. Pullis (Philadelphia Cordwainers' Case), 3 Doc. Hist. of Am. Ind.
Soc. 60 (Philadelphia Mayor's Ct. 1806).
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fortunes, and in the post-war period these profits were utilized to
initiate and develop the modern industrial system. The multifold
abuses of this system were vividly pictured by the so-called "muck-
rakers" of the late nineteenth century, and a changing moral climate
provided room for the existence and even the desirability of unions.
Justice Holmes, then Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Court, wrote
that a strike might be justified, and that "in all such cases the ground
of decision is policy; and the advantages to the community, on the
one side, and the other, are the only matters really entitled to be
weighed."'
Much earlier, Holmes' predecessor, the great Chief Justice Shaw,
had held that a purpose to organize a union is not unlawful, "the
legality of such an association will therefore depend upon the means
to be used for its accomplishments." 4 State judges, closer to the
electorate, became somewhat more chary in their issuance of labor
injunctions. The arena then turned to the federal courts, where
many fascinating chapters evolved which intermesh to form the
history of the labor injunction.
One chapter deals with the use of federal troops to enforce judicial
decrees. During the 1870's and 1880's, when the Knights of Labor
were engaging in widespread strike activity, the law permitted the
federal marshals to call out a posse comitatus to enforce the decrees
of federal judges. The posses largely consisted of the federal troops
in the area. The use of federal troops to break strikes led to the
passage of legislation which provided that only the President could
call forth the troops to execute the laws. President Cleveland used
troops in the famous Pullman Strike of 1894, and the protest of
Illinois' Governor Altgeld equalled that of Arkansas' Governor
Faubus when a later President sent in federal troops to enforce a
different kind of federal court decree.
Another chapter concerns the use of yellow dog contracts. Tradi-
tionally, equity can only act to protect a "property" interest. A
contract creates a property right, but most employment relation-
ships are terminable at will. This led to the innovation of the yellow
dog contract, an agreement by the employee that he would not join
a union during his employment. Once signed, any organizational
effort by a union constituted an inducement to breach a contract, a
traditional area subject to equity relief. The Supreme Court sustained
this theory of the strike injunction in Hitchman Coal &4 Coke Co. v.
Mitchell.' When states such as Kansas sought to outlaw the yellow
'Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).4 Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
5245 U.S. 229 (1917).
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dog contract by legislation, the Supreme Court held that such legis-
lation unconstitutionally infringed on the liberty of contact."
Congressional efforts to "curb the Supreme Court" are a third
chapter, a theme which frequently recurs, albeit in different con-
texts. Many state legislatures had passed remedial statutes limiting
the conditions under which injunctions could be issued in labor
disputes. Arizona, for example, provided that an employer could
seek damages as the result of an unlawful strike, that an employer
could obtain injunctive relief against violent and unlawful union
conduct, but that an employer could not obtain injunctive relief
against lawful picketing for immediate economic objectives. The
Arizona Supreme Court sustained this legislation, but the Supreme
Court, in Truax v. Corrigan,' held that the statute unconstitutionally
deprived an employer of the "equal protection of the laws." The
Truax, Coppage, and other such decisions resulted in efforts headed
by the first Senator LaFollette to "curb the Supreme Court." Legis-
lation was introduced designed to deprive the Supreme Court of
jurisdiction to hear appeals from State Courts in labor cases. How-
ever, these efforts were no more successful than the recent attempts
by some present Members of Congress to enact similar Court-curbing
legislation in another area of "equal protection" cases.
Next consider the perversion of certain federal statutes to create
"federal question" jurisdiction. The Interstate Commerce Act was
primarily designed to protect the midwest farmer from the exorbi-
tant charges of the railroads; but it was also utilized as a source of
federal question jurisdiction to justify injunctions against railroad
unions. This practice was approved in In re Debs.' The Sherman Act
of 1890 was intended as a safeguard against the consequences of
massed aggregations of capital, but early was utilized against the
combinations of laboring men.' This practice, in turn, resulted in the
Clayton Act's pronouncement that: "The labor of a human being is
not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the
anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and opera-
tion of labor organizations ... "
The last chapter to be considered is the impact of labor injunctions
on federal diversity jurisdiction. Federal courts have jurisdiction
when the parties on each side of the controversy are citizens of
different states, i.e., when there is a need for an impartial tribunal.
Federal courts accepted "diversity" jurisdiction in suits filed by New
OCoppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
7257 U.S. 312 (1921).
8158 U.S. 564 (1895).
'See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
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York employers to enjoin New York employees from striking in
New York on the fiction that the New York employer was a citizen
of Delaware because incorporated there. The long fight against this
fiction terminated with the 1958 Amendments to the Judicial Code,
providing in part that for jurisdictional purposes, a corporation is a
citizen of the state where it has its principal place of business. If,
as sometimes happened during the height of the federal court labor
injunction, the employer was unincorporated or incorporated in the
states where his factory was located, the suit was brought by an
out-of-state stockholder, an out-of-state creditor, or an out-of-state
customer naming both the employer and the union as parties de-
fendant. The federal courts ignored economic reality and instead
subscribed to the purely technical allegations of diversity of citizen-
ship. This had an impact on the present doctrine of realignment,
i.e., for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the courts can look through
the allegations in the complaint and re-align the parties according
to their rightful interests in the results sought.
Throughout the long history of the labor injunction the problem
of "states rights" has been present. The Conformity Act requires the
federal court judges to conform to the laws of the states wherein they
sit. Mr. Justice Storey, however, in Swift v. Tyson" held that a
state court decision is not a "law" within the meaning of the Con-
formity Act. For almost a century, until Swift v. Tyson was over-
ruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins," the federal judges were free, and
made liberal use of this freedom to issue injunctions when petitions
therefor would have been denied by the state court across the
square. The natural consequence was the cry that the federal gov-
ernment was intruding into an area reserved to the states by the
tenth amendment.
C. Opposition To Labor Injunctions
The use of labor injunctions by the federal judiciary was not with-
out great protest. The Debs injunction, which broke the Pullman
strike, was sustained by the Supreme Court in 1895. The 1896
Democratic platform inveighed against "Government by injunc-
tion" in these words:
We denounce arbitrary interference by Federal authorities in local
affairs as a violation of the Constitution of the United States and a
crime against free institutions, and we especially object to government
by injunction as a new and highly dangerous form of oppression by
"°14 U.S. (16 Pet.) 166 (1842).
" 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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which Federal Judges, in contempt of the laws of the States and rights
of citizens, become at once legislators, judges and executioners.
By 1908 the platforms of both the Democratic and Republican
Parties had planks against the unbridled use of the labor injunction.
Bills were introduced in each session of Congress for twenty years,
from 1894 until 1914, designed to curb the use of the labor in-
junction. President Teddy Roosevelt sent five successive messages to
Congress asking the reform. President Taft, in his 1909 State Of
The Union Message stressed the need for reform.
In 1912 Wilson was elected President, on the promise of a New
Freedom. This campaign pledge of a New Freedom resulted, among
other things, in the Clayton Act of 1914. Section 6 of that Act
provides in part:
That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed
to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horti-
cultural organizations . . . or to forbid or restrain individual members
of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof. ...
John W. Davis, a Congressman from West Virginia, was a staunch
supporter of this Act. He spoke of "five glaring abuses which have
crept into the administration of this remedy" (the labor injunction):
The issuance of injunctions without notice.
The issuance of injunctions without bond.
The issuance of injunctions without detail.
The issuance of injunctions without parties.
And in trade disputes particularly, the issuance of injunctions against
certain well-established and indispensable rights.
The Clayton Act attempted to correct these abuses in a number
of ways. Time limitations were imposed on the ex parte temporary
restraining orders. The complaint and the orders were required to
be detailed. Contempt proceedings were to be by jury if the con-
temptuous acts were illegal. Certain activities, mainly the various
forms of picketing, were singled out specifically as immune from
restraining orders or injunctions "in any case between an employer
and employees . . . growing out of a dispute concerning terms or
conditions of employment." Samuel Gompers hailed this Act as "the
industrial magna charta," but he reckoned without the ingenuity of
the federal courts. The courts, in the language of Frankfurter and
Greene, "stuck close to the bark of this language."
The Clayton Act prohibits injunctions in any case "between an
employer and an employee." However, by going on strike, the em-
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ployee terminates the employment relationship, and the Clayton
Act is therefore not applicable. The Act prohibits an injunction in
"a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment"; but
"unionization" of a shop is not a "term or condition of employment."
The Act protects "peaceful and lawful" persuasion; but a strike
against a unionized employer to induce withdrawal of patronage
from a non-union employer is not "lawful." So reasoned the federal
courts, and following the Clayton Act, injunctions were issued in
ten of the next thirteen cases in which they were requested.
The Supreme Court endorsed this restricted interpretation of the
Clayton Act. In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering," the Court
enjoined the Machinists and affiliated unions from striking against
Duplex and its customers to win a closed shop, an eight-hour day,
and a union scale of wages. In the Bedford Cut Stone case,"' the
Court restrained a union refusal to work upon stone which had been
quarried by men working in opposition to the union.
Decisions such as these led to a renewal of the legislative struggle
against use of the labor injunction. This effort culminated in 1932
with the Norris-LaGuardia Act which enjoyed great popular sup-
port. It was passed by large majorities in both Houses of Congress,
commanded strong support in both the Democratic and Republican
parties, and was approved by President Hoover.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was designed to end the abuses in the
use of the labor injunction; not the labor injunction itself. This was
accomplished by two different methods. First, it imposed procedural
restrictions which litigants had to observe to get injunctions; and
second, it restricted the substantive content of the injunction which
the federal courts might issue.
Procedurally, the ex parte injunction was put to an end with the
provision that all temporary restraining orders should become void
within five days unless continued after trial in court within such
period, and even ex parte orders must be based upon the testimony
of witnesses presented in a court hearing. The complainant was re-
quired to come into court with clean hands and show that he had
made full use of existing governmental mediation machinery to effect
a settlement of the dispute. The judge was required to find as a
fact, before an injunction could be issued, that the injury to the
complainant's property was imminent and that his injury would be
greater than that which the defendants would suffer if the injunc-
12 254 U.S. 443 (1921).




tion were granted. If violence was claimed, the court was required
to bring in public officers and satisfy itself that existing public pro-
tection was inadequate. Jury trial, upon demand, was made available
to those charged with contempt.
Substantively, a long list of activities were protected from in-
junction. These included strikes, payment of strike benefits, picket-
ing, etc. All these activities were protected in all cases "involving
or growing out of a labor dispute," and a labor dispute was defined
to include "any controversy concerning terms or conditions of em-
ployment, or concerning the association or representation of persons
in negotiating ... terms or conditions of employment, regardless
of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relations
of employer and employee.""
The Norris-LaGuardia Act achieved its intended effect. Prior to
its enactment, there were at least 508 reported labor injunctions, the
great majority issued during the 1920's. In the next twenty-five
years, only 43 federal court injunctions, apart from Taft-Hartley
restraining orders, survived the initial five day ex parte restraining
order. Nine of these were issued at the request of the Government;
in most of the others, there were findings that no "labor dispute"
was involved.
If there is still a problem of "government by injunction," it lies
in the injunctions issued under the Taft-Hartley Act. President
Kennedy has called together a group of experts to advise on the
use of injunctions under the National Emergencies' provisions of
that Act. Moreover, the Labor Board is presently re-evaluating the
use of injunctions under the sections of the Act within the province
of the Board.
III. TAFT-HARTLEY INJUNCTIONS
Sections 10(e), (1), and (j) are the provisions of the Labor-
Management Relations Act governing injunctions and will be dis-
cussed in order before drawing any general conclusions.
A. Section 10(e) Injunctions
Section 10(e) provides that whenever one of the Board's orders
(made after notice, hearing, appeal from the trial examiner, etc.)
is disobeyed, the Board may petition the appropriate court of appeals
"for enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary relief
or restraining order." Section 10(e)'s injunctive provisions were in
the original 1935 Wagner Act, and neither at that time nor in the
14 Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1959).
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Taft-Hartley Amendments was there any congressional discussion
of their intended use.
The Board has used the 10(e) injunctive remedy very sparingly,
on an average, not more than three or four times a year. The single
largest category of cases are those in which we seek to enjoin the
dissipation of assets when we seek to enforce a back pay award. We
have also used 10 (e) to prevent an employer from negotiating with
a union which has been determined to be company dominated, or
with one not certified after an election. Other instances of its
utilization are those in which the Board sought to enjoin an employer
from renewed anti-union activities which would further postpone
an election; and to restrain a union from engaging in secondary
boycott activities against employers other than those involved in
our case-in-chief.
The Board has had a good record of success in the courts, particu-
larly since the enactment of Taft-Hartley. It has been suggested
that more extended use be made of this injunctive power, particu-
larly against those activities which could be enjoined under Sections
10(1) and (j). These two sections authorize temporary injunctive
relief in the district court prior to determination of the issues of
the Board. After the Board has arrived at its decision, the district
court injunction under 10(1) terminates, and it is argued with some
justification that the Board should seek to enjoin the resumption of
these activities pending circuit court enforcement of the order.
B. Section 10(l) Injunctions
Section 10(l) is the mandatory injunction section. In essence,
and with qualifications not too important for the present discus-
sion, it provides that when a charge is received by the Board con-
cerning alleged violations by labor unions of the so-called secondary
boycott, hot cargo, and organizational picketing provisions, and
when an investigation of these charges gives "reasonable cause to
believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue," the
Board is required to petition the appropriate district court for a
temporary injunction pending final Board disposition of the matter.
Section 10(1) also authorizes, but does not require, the Board to
seek an injunction when a jurisdictional strike is alleged.
At this point a short analysis of the section 10(1) injunction is
pertinent. Since the injunctions against the "hot cargo" clause and
"organizational picketing" were added by the 1959 Landrum-Griffin
amendments, a long range evaluation must be confined to the so-
called secondary boycott types of activities.
1962]
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In the past five years the Board has petitioned for 649 injunctions
under 10 (1), with an increase each year.1 This number of injunction
petitions does not mean that the Board files a petition every time it
receives a charge. The statute provides that the Board shall petition
for an injunction whenever after investigation it "has reasonable
cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should
issue." In 1960, the Board received 1,003 such charges, but after
investigation, filed only 219 complaints and requests for injunction.
In 1959, the Board received 844 charges under 8 (b) (4) and filed
only 129 petitions for injunction. In 1958, the Board received 719
charges under 8 (b) (4) and petitioned for 127 injunctions.
In short, there is nothing automatic about petitioning for an
injunction upon receipt of an employer charge that a union has en-
gaged in a secondary boycott situation. There is a careful investiga-
tion by Board staff members to determine whether or not there is
"reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint
should issue." Although some injunction petitions are issued within
days (as recently in the case of missile site disputes within our
jurisdiction), in a majority of cases filed in the first three years of
the Taft-Hartley Act, a month or more was required to investigate
the charges thoroughly and compile the evidence before an in-
junction was filed."'
The district courts are more apt to find "reasonable cause" for
the issuance of injunctions than are the employees of the Board.
The district courts, of course, do not and cannot go fully into the
merits. They base their rulings on a reasonable cause to believe that
the violation has been committed, and that equitable relief is "just
and proper." Their issuance of an injunction is reversible on appeal
only for an abuse of discretion. In 1960, only ninety-two of the
219 petitions filed under Section 10 (1) went to final order, the courts
granting injunction in eighty-three cases and denying injunctions
in nine. In 1959, sixty petitions went to final order, injunctions
being granted in fifty cases and denied in ten. In 1958, sixty-eight
injunction petitions went to final order, fifty-nine were granted and
nine denied. In this most recent three-year period, 220 petitions
under 10(l) went to final order with the district courts granting
192 injunctions and denying twenty-eight of the injunction petitions.
A historic justification for the preliminary labor injunction is that
it does not pass finally on the merits of the controversy. Therefore,
it is argued, there is nothing wrong in judging on probabilities rather
'5 1956-78; 1957-98; 1958-127; 1959-129; 1960-219.
1"Blumenthal, Mandatory Injunction and the NLRB, 2 Lab. L.J. 7 (1951).
[Vol. 16
THE LABOR INJUNCTION
than on facts and a careful, long look at the legal principles. How-
ever, as pointed out by Frankfurter and Greene, "The tentative truth
results in making ultimate truth irrelevant."'" The injunction often
handcuffs the union, and it is forced to make the best terms available,
thereby mooting the case. Board statistics bear this out. Of the first
seventy-two petitions under 10 (1) for temporary injunctions, twelve
never reached trial because of settlement, and an additional sixteen
never reached Board decision because of settlement or other similar
action." In 1960, the federal district courts issued eighty-three in-
junctions under 10 (1), and seventy-three of these cases were settled
without further Board action.
Since the court injunction is in most cases dispositive of the issue,
it is interesting to see whether or not the district courts are in agree-
ment with the Labor Board. The experience of the first three years
indicates that the incidence of agreement is in accordance with the
law of probabilities. In the first thirty-two cases to reach the Board
wherein the district courts had taken final action, the Board was in
complete agreement with the courts in fifteen cases, and was in com-
plete disagreement with the courts in fifteen cases, and was in partial
agreement and in partial disagreement with the courts in two cases.
This result is not unexpected considering the complexity of the
legal issues, " and the fact that the 10(1) injunction petition may
well be the first "labor" case brought before the particular federal
district judge, and he is obligated to make a decision under a terrific
time pressure.
Both the Cox Panel and the Pucinski Subcommittee recommended
legislative change, that Section 10 (l) "permit" rather than "require"
the Board to seek an injunction. This is a matter beyond the Board's
province, but another recommendation of the Pucinski Committee
is not. The Report of that Committee:
finds that Section 10(l) cases, once the court injunction has been
issued, have not been expedited in the administrative process. The Labor
Board Rules and Regulations require that such cases "shall be given
priority" (Sec. 102.97), but there are so many cases given priority
that this is apparently meaningless. The Subcommittee recommends
that the labor Board give these cases expeditious treatment by
new devices and techniques, such as: permitting the respondent to
appeal directly to the Board on the basis of the facts found by the
court which issued the injunction; by denying all requests for exten-
"Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction 79 (1930).
"Blumenthal, supra note 16, at 9.
"I refer to the construction gate and ambulatory picketing cases which are in the
forefront of "secondary boycott situations"; and to the contract-bar rules which are in-
volved in "organizational" picketing.
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sion of time; by curtailing the number of days permitted in filing
complaints, answers, exceptions, and other legal documents; by estab-
lishing a special "expediting" section at the Board level for treating
such cases, and so on.
These recommendations are now under careful study by the Board.
C. Section 10 (j) Injunctions
Section 10(j) is the "discretionary" injunction section. It author-
izes the Board to petition a district court for "appropriate temporary
relief or restraining order" in respect to any unfair labor practice,
whether committed by an employer or a union, after a Board com-
plaint has been issued.
Section 10(j) was added in the Taft-Hartley Amendments, and
it was incorporated in the Act due to the inability of the Board in
ttsome instances" to "correct unfair labor practices until after sub-
stantial injury has been done." The need for section 10(j) was ex-
pressed in the Senate Report as follows:
Experience under the National Labor Relations Act has demon-
strated that by reason of lengthy hearings and litigation enforcing its
orders, the Board has not been able in some instances to correct unfair
labor practices until after substantial injury has been done. . . Since
the Board's orders are not self-enforcing, it has sometimes been possible
for persons violating the act to accomplish their unlawful objective
before being placed under any legal restraint and thereby to make it
impossible or not feasible to restore or preserve the status quo pend-
ing litigation.
The Board, however, has requested very few 10 (j) injunctions, only
forty-eight in the past fourteen years, despite some sixty requests an-
nually. In 1960, the Board filed five petitions for injunction under
section 10(j), one against an employer, three against unions, and
one against both the employer and the union. Two of the cases were
settled before court action; the three petitions against unions re-
sulted in injunctions. In 1959, there were four petitions for injunc-
tions against unions; all of which were granted. There was one
petition for an injunction against an employer, and the case was
settled before the court acted on the petition. In 1958, there were
six petitions for injunctions against unions; three were granted, one
was denied, and two cases were settled before the court acted. We
petitioned for one injunction against an employer, and it was granted.
There has been a total of thirty-three petitions for injunctions
against unions, of which twenty-three were granted and in ten cases
the matter was settled before court action. There have been twelve
injunctions sought against employers, of which five were granted,
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two denied, and in five cases the matter was settled before court
action. There have been three petitions sought against both employer
and unions; all were granted.
1. Increased Use of 10 (j) Injunctions
A number of witnesses before the Pucinski Committee complained
bitterly about what they described as a lack of "even-handed justice."
They pointed out, for example, that since 1952, the Labor Board
has sought 601 injunctions against unions pursuant to Section 10 (l),
an additional seventeen injunctions against unions under section
10(j), and only six injunctions against employers, all under section
10(j). The Pucinski Committee rejected any concept that justice
can be achieved mechanically, i.e., by dividing the total number of
injunctions equally between those against employers and those against
unions. However, the Pucinski Committee did conclude that "failure
to utilize the 10(j) discretionary injunction sometimes results in
irreparable injury," and the Committee recommended that:
The Labor Board give careful consideration to greater utilization of
the 10(j) injunction in situations when unfair labor practice charges
are filed and the Board finds reasonable cause to believe that such un-
fair labor practice is continuing and will be continued unless restrained,
and will cause irreparable property or personal injury or injury to the
exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7.
Illustrations given by the Pucinski Committee were:
flagrant and aggravated acts of picket line force and violence, the
situations of repeated discharge of union adherents, the situations where
employers or unions flagrantly refuse to bargain in good faith, and the
situations wherein the employer threatens to intimidate his employees
by closing the plant or shifting work to affiliated factories.
I am mindful of the Pucinski Committee recommendations, and
they appear valid. I am also mindful, and this I do not believe creates
any inconsistencies, of the long history of abuses which culminated
first in the Clayton Act of 1914 and ultimately in the Norris-La-
Guardia Act of 1932.
For example, I am mindful that breaches of the peace may be
redressed through criminal prosecutions and civil action for damages;
and I am reminded that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits a
federal judge from enjoining violence without first consulting with
appropriate public officials charged with police enforcement.
I am mindful of the dangers of the ex parte injunction issued on
the basis of affidavits filled with sound and fury, but signifying little
in the concrete. But I know from the experience of the Norris-
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LaGuardia Act that these dangers can be greatly minimized by
setting a time limit on the duration of such injunctions and re-
quiring the court attendance of those in the best position to testify
as to the facts.
I am mindful of the dangers of the broad injunction prohibiting
"opprobrious language," "unlawful conduct," "mass picketing," by
the defendants, "their agents, allies, and parties in interest." But I
also know that it is possible to frame an injunction order in specific
and definite language: "No picketing of gate No. 3, reserved for
employees of contractors"; "no more than ten pickets patrolling at
any given time," etc., etc.
I am mindful of the complexities of our industrial society and
the conflicting interests which must be considered in even the
"simplest" labor case. I sympathize with the federal judge who
must decide such problems "forthwith" even though he may be
totally unfamiliar with the subject. And I realize fully that his
decision, though labeled "tentative" and "preliminary," is for prac-
tical purposes in many instances final. To quote again from Frank-
furter and Greene:
The injunction cannot preserve the so-called status quo; the situation
does not remain in equilibrium awaiting judgment upon full knowledge.
The suspension of activities affects only the strikers; the employer re-
sumes his efforts to defeat the strike, and resumes them free from the
interdicted interferences. Moreover, the suspension of strike activities,
even temporarily, may defeat the strike for practical purposes and fore-
doom its resumption even if the injunction is later lifted.
But the Norris-LaGuardia Act requirement that employers come
into court with clean hands, i.e., that they first make every effort to
resolve the dispute through good faith bargaining, indicates that
there is a way out of this dilemma.
I am mindful that seasoned labor-management attorneys advise
their clients against the injunction because of the bitterness which
spills over into subsequent relationships; and that injunctions are
most useful when the parties are struggling against the initial shock
of collective bargaining.
But finally, and most importantly, I am mindful that the question
of national policy concerning the labor injunction is primarily a
task of the legislative body; and that Congress has set forth its policy
affirmatively in Section 10(j) of the Labor-Management Relations
Act.
2. Guide Lines in Seeking More 10(j) Injunctions
What, then, are the general lines of policy that may guide the
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Board's consideration of more extensive use of discretionary in-
junctions? Each individual petition for a 10(j) injunction must, of
course, be decided on its own facts and on its own merits. There
are, however, certain criteria or considerations which are applicable
in most situations.
First, the extraordinary remedy of injunction should not and
cannot become the ordinary remedy in unfair labor practice cases.
Congress delegated to the five-man National Labor Relations Board
sitting in Washington, and not to the district courts, the duty to
give an expert and experienced content and direction to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. It follows that the Board cannot abdicate
this function to the 226 judges sitting in the 86 federal district
courts. Except for extraordinary injunctive relief, the normal role
of the judiciary is set forth in sections 10 (e) and (f) of the Act,
i.e., the courts of appeals can review our decisions to ascertain
whether our fact findings have warrant in the record and our legal
conclusions have a reasonable basis in law.
Second (and apart from policy considerations requiring a uniform
national labor policy), some, but not all cases, may be competently
tried by a seasoned judge with no labor law experience. Some cases
involve the application of well-defined doctrine to easily ascertained
factual situations; others require a thorough exploration of sophisti-
cated imponderables concerning motive, conflicting legal principles,
and rival policy factors. In some cases the violation is clear; in
others the violation is veiled. In short, some cases are adaptable to
peremptory, judicial resolution by ascertaining the facts; other
cases are not.
Third, the factor of clean hands is an important consideration.
Has the charging party who requests that we petition for an in-
junction conformed his conduct to the requirements of the law? Is
this the "charged" party's first alleged offense, or is it a continuing
or repetitious pattern?
Fourth, the irreparable injury to the parties and to the public must
be considered. Is the industry crucial to the public interest? Does the
alleged unfair labor practice involve a wide geographic area and a
large number of persons? Will our failure to act create disrespect
for lawful processes, public agencies, or national policies? If only
the particular parties are concerned, will our subsequent remedy be
adequate to restore the status quo and dissipate the consequences of
the unfair labor practice?
Finally, the Board must determine whether a petition for an in-
junction is necessary to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
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Relations Act, i.e., to encourage the practices of collective bargain-
ing. Does our refusal to seek injunctive relief give the charging party
the unhappy choice of (1) following the long, drawn-out admin-
istrative process with knowledge that the treasure at the end of the
trail is only "fool's gold," (2) resorting to self-help in the form of
economic warfare and thereby impeding the flow of interstate com-
merce, or (3) shrugging off the whole thing with a cynical comment
about the nature of "city hall"?
In the past, more than half of the cases in which section 10 (j)
relief has been authorized involved refusals to bargain in compliance
with the thirty day notice and other requirements of the Act. Almost
one-third involved attempts to enforce closed shop conditions or
discrimination in employment opportunities because of non-mem-
bership in a union. Most of the remainder have involved extended
strike violence.
The Board also sought 10 (j) injunctive relief against an employer
who discharged his employees for testifying against him in an unfair
labor practice case; against an employer who made unilateral changes
of employment without prior negotiation with the union; against
a union's attempt to retain unlawful closed shop conditions in an
entire industry; and against a union which sought to put a small
milk hauler out of business for failure to agree to illegal hiring
practices.
The Labor Board, in close cooperation with the General Counsel,
is considering the various areas in which the use of the 10(j) in-
junction might be extended, areas where interlocutory and temporary
relief is desirable, and the historic problems of the labor injunction
might be avoided.
3. Possible Areas of Greater 10 (j) Use
The thinking of the Board at this point is tentative, and of
necessity, generalized. No hard and fast lines have been laid down
for action in this area. However, to the extent the Board decides
to use discretionary injunctions more often in cases filed with it,
consistent with the five policy considerations mentioned above, i.e.,
unclean hands, irreparable injury, appropriateness for judicial treat-
ment, etc., the Board will probably continue to seek injunctive relief
against serious union picket line violence when it clearly gets beyond
the control of local authorities; it will no doubt continue to seek
injunctive relief against strikes when timely notice is not given to
the mediation services; it will doubtless continue to seek injunctive
relief against union efforts to secure an illegal closed shop type of
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situation. These types of charges constitute the great majority of
charges which the Board receives.
Turning to the employer unfair labor practices, the greatest
number of charges received by the Board continues to be the illegal
discharges because of union activities. There could appropriately be
a greater emphasis on the use of the injunction to prevent recurring,
anti-union campaigns designed to stifle organizational drives. Thus,
the Board could well seek injunctions to restore discharged employees
to their jobs, if they are the leading union adherents and discharged
at the outset of an organizational drive. Experience has taught us
that our remedy of ultimate reinstatement with back pay is regarded
in some quarters as no more than a fee for a union-hunting license.
Here, the Board can seek more injunctions against the creation and
domination of "company unions" to avoid freezing of employee
sentiment in favor of the assisted union by reason of the benefits
received voluntarily from the employer. Finally, we have been most
recently requested to seek to enjoin an employer from threatening
to close a plant because the employees vote for a union, for this type
of threat and action effectively kills freedom of self-organization and
collective bargaining beyond hope of resurrection.
The second largest area of employer unfair labor practice cases
concerns refusal to bargain. Experience has shown that an employer's
successful postponement of bargaining for the year or two it takes
to process a Labor Board case and the additional year or two it takes
to secure judicial enforcement of the Labor Board order, frequently
dissipates the union's majority status and weakens its bargaining
power to the extent that it can no longer effectively represent the
employees. This justifies a more extensive use of Section 10(j) in
respect to limited refusals to bargain, such as unilateral changes,
refusals to discuss certain matters, refusals to furnish required in-
formation, insistence on illegal demands, and the like.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Board's desire is not to transfer its problems to the judicial
forum. It is the experienced expectation of the Board that violations
of the act can be deterred by indicating a readiness to seek injunctive
relief when the incentive to resist unfair labor practice charges rests
on the advantage of time and delay.
The Labor Board is given the authority to seek injunctions as one
means, among others, to remedy the problems that stem from delay.
The parties and the public now suffer seriously from this delay in the
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processing of labor cases. It is perhaps our greatest single problem.
However, it is not in our hands to question the tools given us by
Congress to cope with this problem. With trepidation, good faith,
and a full knowledge of the pitfalls demonstrated by history, we
can nevertheless make our way forward with the 10(j) injunction.
There is a good chance that we shall thereby advance collective
bargaining and give new meaning to the purposes and promises of
the statute.
